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where a person left his auto parked on the side of a hill and the car from
some unknown cause rolled down the hill and hit plaintiff; Scovannin v.
Toelke, II9 Ohio St. 256, 163 N.E. 495 (1928) where a truck
operated by the defendant ran off the highway and collided with and
damaged a building, and no other testimony was produced to prove
negligent operation of the truck; Trauerntan v. Oliver's .4dm'r. 125
Va. 458, 99 S.E. 647 (1919) where it was held that an auto driver
who collided with another person while the latter was standing upon the
sidewalk, must show that he did everything an ordinary reasonably
prudent person would have done to avoid injury. In one Ohio case,
however, no presumption or inference of negligence was held to arise.
Allen v. Learick, 43 Ohio App. IOO, 182 N.E. 139 (1932) where a
guest passenger was not permitted to recover under the res ipsa rule for
being thrown from the seat when the automobile bounced while crossing
an intersection.
In the principal case the instrumentality was under the control of
the defendant. Since an accident does not ordinarily happen by a car
leaving the road if reasonable care is used, the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to this situation seems justified.
JOSEPH STERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
POWER OF BOARD OF EDUCATION TO COMPEL SALUTE TO
FLAG - INVASION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Some time ago, the Board of Education of Greenfield, Ohio, estab-
lished the rule that "the Superintendent of Schools is directed to require
the flag salute and the pledge of allegiance from all pupils attending
the Greenfield Schools at such times and on such occasions as he may
direct." Ordinarily, the Superintendent required the salute and pledge
of allegiance only at assemblies of a patriotic nature, but teachers were
allowed to hold similar ceremonies as opening exercises. Though these
practices had been in effect over a period of time, no one, parents or
children, had objected until November, 1935. At that time, the par-
ents of four pupils, who were members of Jehovah's Witnesses, a re-
ligious sect, ordered their children not to salute the flag. The board
of education settled the problem by excluding these children from all
exercises at which a flag salute or pledge of allegiance was to be given.
The same problem has arisen in East Liverpool, but it has not been
solved so amicably. There, the board of education expelled those who
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refused to salute or take the oath of allegiance. As a result, the mother
of one of the expelled pupils, who is qualified to teach, is contemplating
starting a private school for the children of Jehovah's Witnesses.
In a recent opinion, the attorney general upheld the action of the
East Liverpool Board as being within their power and constitutional.
No. 5003, 42 Ohio State Department Reports 183, Jan. 2, 1936.
This formal opinion reversed a previous informal statement from the
attorney general's office.
Jehovah's Witnesses are a religious sect and consider themselves the
only true followers of Jesus Christ. Their name is derived from the
belief that they are to witness the second coming of Christ. They have
a covenant to obey God and Jesus Christ only, and, in their opinion, to
break this covenant means their destruction. Pledging their allegiance
to the flag would be a breach of the covenant, for their allegiance is to
Jehovah only. They base their belief and action on the command of
Exodus 20:3-5:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any-
thing that is in the heaven above or that is in the earth beneath or that is in
the water under the earth.
Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them, for I, the Lord
thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.
The flag salute is also a breach of their covenant, for the flag is an
image or representation of the United States nation, and the salute
amounts to an act of worshipping this image.
The first problem raised by the situations described above is whether
or not the board of education had the power to establish the rule in-
volved. A board of education has the power to "make such rules as it
deems necessary for the government of the pupils of its schools." G.C.
4750. It also has the power to arrange the course of study to be fol-
lowed in its schools, G.C. 7645, and the general power to manage and
control all public schools within its district. G.C. 769 o . The rule al-
lowing the superintendent to require the flag salute and pledge of alle-
giance might well be sustained under any one of these powers. These
powers are general, and so any action taken under them would be dis-
cretionary as to its details.
There is abundant authority to support the statement that, in the
absence of fraud or bad faith, the courts will not interfere with the
board of education's exercise of its discretionary powers to manage and
control schools or establish rules and regulations for them unless such
exercise is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be an abuse of its discre-
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tion. Board of Ed. v. Boehm, 102 Ohio St. 292, 131 N.E. 812
(1921); State v. Board of Ed., ii Ohio App. 146, 30 O.C.A. 365
(i919); Brannon v. Board of Ed., 99 Ohio St. 369, 124 N.E. 235
(I9'9); TVagoman v. Board of Ed., 5 Ohio App. 380, 27 O.C.A.
267 (1916); Cline v. Martin, 5 Ohio App. 90, 24 C.C. (N.S.) 8i
( 1915); Board of Ed. v. State, 8o Ohio St. 133, 88 N.E. 4 12 (1 9 09 );
Board of Ed. v. County Comm., io N.P. (N.S.) 505 (19o9); State
v. Milhoff, 76 Ohio St. 297, 81 N.E. 568 (1907); Youmans v. Board
of Ed., Ii C.C. 207, 7 C.D. 269 (1896); (rule that pupil could be
expelled for failure to have lesson prepared held reasonable) Sewell v.
Board of Ed., 29 Ohio St. 89 (1876). But courts have interfered with
the exercise of discretionary powers by the boards of education where
such exercise was arbitrary and unreasonable. Robinson v. McDonald,
5 Ohio App. 376, 26 C.C. (N.S.) 137 (1916); Owens v. Board of
Ed., 25 O.C.C. (N.S.) 58I, 25 O.D. i6I (1914).
Where the board of education repealed a rule requiring reading of
the Bible in school and established a rule prohibiting it, Board of Ed. v.
Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 13 Am. Rep. 233 (1872); Board of Ed.
v. Pulse, 7 O.N.P. 58, io O.D. (N.P.) 17 (i9OO), and where the
board passed a rule requiring the reading of the Bible in school, Nessle v.
Hun, i O.N.P. 140, 2 O.D. (N.P.) 6o (1899), it was held that the
actions were reasonable and beyond the reach of the courts. Such regu-
lations raise the issue of freedom of conscience, as guaranteed by the
Ohio Constitution, more directly than the rule as to saluting the flag.
From these authorities, it would seem that the establishment of the
rule of the Greenfield Board of Education would be within the power
of the board if it is reasonable and not arbitrary. This is purely a mat-
ter to be decided at the trial.
The Jehovah's Witnesses maintain that even though this is a proper
and valid rule, it interferes with their religious freedom. The Ohio
Constitution says: "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own con-
science," Art. I, Sec. 7, and the I4 th Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution provides that "no state shall deprive any persons of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."
The 14th Amendment must be considered here, for religious free-
dom is one of the liberties protected, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. ed. 1042 (1923), but the ist and 5th Amend-
ments are inapplicable, for they restrict the actions of the Federal gov-
ernment only.
The maintenance of public schools, Fawcett v. Ball, 8o Cal. App.
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13I, 251 Pac. 679 (1923), and the promotion of public education,
Broderick v. Stone, 258 N.Y.S. 717, 144 Misc. Rep. 393 (1932),
are governmental functions. Thus the establishment of rules and regu-
lations for schools is within the police power, i.e., the general regulatory
power, of the state. Pohl v. State, 102 Ohio St. 474, 132 N.E. 20
(1921); Meyer v. Nebraska, supra. Any rule-making power the board
of education may have is derived from the state's general power to leg-
islate, and any exercise of such power is an exercise of the state's police
power.
Personal and private rights guaranteed by constitutions are not
absolute. They are subject to reasonable regulations which may be
imposed by the legislature. Pohl v. State, supra.; Soloman v. Cleveland,
26 Ohio App. 19, 159 N.E. 121 (1926); State v. Powell, 58 Ohio
St. 324, 40 N.E. 900 (1898); ("religious freedom does not deprive
the legislature of its legislative power"), New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt,
io9 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (i918). However, any exercise of the
police power will be invalid if it unreasonably or arbitrarily invades
personal rights, Merick v. Gims, 79 Ohio St. I74, 86 N.E. 88 (i9o8),
or if it is not related to the "public use or public benefit." Alma Coal
Co. v. Cozad, 79 Ohio St. 348, 87 N.E. 172 (i909). The legisla-
ture cannot interfere with personal rights unless the public welfare re-
quires it. State v. Robins, 71 Ohio St. 273, 73 N.E. 470 (1905).
Laws making bigamy a crime and making bigamists ineligible to
hold public office have been held valid even though they directly inter-
fered with the religious practices and teachings of the Mormons. For
the protection of public morals, religious freedom may be invaded.
Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U.S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878); "The laws
cannot interfere with religious beliefs, but they may with practices."
Toncray v. Budge, 14 Ida. 621, 95 Pac. 26 (i9o8); Miles v. U. S.,
103 U.S. 304, 26 L. ed. 481 (188o); Davis v. Beeson, 133 U.S. 333,
1O S. Ct. 299, 33 L. ed. 637 (1889); The Late Corporation of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Later-Day Saints v. U. S., 136 U.S. i,
Io S. Ct. 792, 34 L. ed. 478 (189o).
Likewise, religious freedom must give way to legislation in the inter-
ests of public health. Requiring a Christian Science healer to have a
license to practice medicine is not an unconstitutional interference with
his religious freedom, State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21, 73 N.E. 1o63
(1905); State v. Miller, 59 N.D. 286, 229 N.W. 569 (1930); State
v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 Pac. (2d) io83 (1932), and a New
York statute which made it a misdemeanor to fail to furnish medical
attendance to a minor was held valid even though the parents' religion
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called for divine healing. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 2O, 68 N.E.
243 (1903). Excluding pupils who have not been vaccinated from
public schools is valid, for the necessity of protecting the public health
justifies any invasion of religious freedom involved. Vonnegut v. Baum,
i88 N.E. 677 (Ind., 1934); New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, supra.
The religious practices of the Salvation Army have been restricted
in the interest of the public peace to the extent of requiring members of
that organization to get licenses to play instruments or to parade in the
streets. Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224
(1889); In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N.W. 72 (1886); State v.
Vhite, 64 N.H. 48, 5 Ad. 828 (i886). Ordinances which make it
a misdemeanor to indulge in common labor on Sunday do not infringe
anyone's religious freedom by requiring him to observe a religious holi-
day. Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387 (1853), McGatrck v.
TVason, 4 Ohio St. 566 (I855); State v. Blair, 13o Kan. 863, 288
Pac. 729 (1930).
Measures adopted to promote the public welfare may validly invade
religious freedom and other personal rights. Ohio decisions of long
standing have held that rules requiring or prohibiting Bible reading in
public schools are valid and do not violate freedom of worship. Board
of Ed. v. Minor, supra.; Board of Ed. v. Pulse, supra.; Messle v. Hun,
supra. More recently, the Georgia court has adopted the same view,
TVilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, iio S.E. 895 (1922), and
other states have followed it with the qualification that compulsory
Bible reading is constitutional only if those who do not want to listen are
allowed to retire. People v. Stanley, 81 Co1. 276, 255 Pac. 6Io
(927); Kaplan v. School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18
(1927). It is impossible to say whether the attitude of the Ohio Su-
preme Court on this issue has changed in the last seventy years.
In the interests of public safety, courts have required fortune tellers
and persons canvassing in behalf of a religious publication to get licenses
though their religious beliefs prompted them to carry on such activities.
Hass v. State, 26 O.C.C. (N.S.) 545, 28 C.D. I (1917); St. Louis v.
Helscher, 295 Mo. 293, 242 S.W. 652 (1922); State v. Neitzel, 69
Wash. 567, 125 Pac. 939 (1912); Maplewood Twp. v..dlbright, 13
N.J. Misc. 46, 176 At. 194 (N.J., 1935).
The I4 th Amendment places a limitation on a state's power in addi-
tion to any which may be included in the state constitution. Religious
freedom is included in the liberties protected from invasion except by
due process of law. Meyer v. Nebraska, supra. But, in relation to an
exercise of the police power, due process is not violated except where the
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regulatory action is arbitrary or unreasonable. Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (I93); Haskell v.
Howard, 269 Ill. 550, io9 N.E. 992 (915); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. 1070 (1925).
A board of education in Ohio has the power to expel a pupil upon
a two-thirds vote of its members, G.C. 7685, and if the rule, for the
violation of which the pupil is expelled, is within the power of the board,
expulsion is allowable. Sewell v. Board of Ed., supra. In the absence
of any express grant of power, pupils have been denied admittance to
public schools in the interests of the public welfare. New Braunfels v.
Waldschmidt, supra. Thus, the courts would probably interfere in a
case of expulsion only if the board abused its discretion. The constitu-
tionality of such action would depend on the considerations mentioned
above.
If, before November 5, 1935, the Jehovah's Witnesses had estab-
lished a private school with one of their own number as teacher, the
teacher would have been required to take a special oath of allegiance
to the United States government. G.C. 7852-1, 7852-2, 7852-3.
This would have raised a problem similar to that relating to the pupils
in the public schools. However, these sections have been repealed, i16
Ohio Laws 548, and the difficulty is thus avoided.
The constitutionality of the rules adopted by the boards of education
in the situations under consideration depends on whether they have
sufficient relation to the public welfare (education) to make them rea-
sonable regulations and to keep them out of the category of an unrea-
sonable and arbitrary interference with a personal liberty. In all
likelihood, any court to which this question is presented will feel that
the teaching of patriotism is sufficiently necessary and reasonable to
warrant the invasion of religious freedom involved.
The obvious purpose of the boards of education is to teach patriot-
ism. Experience has shown that that which is taught by coercion is
seldom learned. If the boards act to the extent of their power, they may
well defeat their own ends. Pupils who honestly object to saluting or
pledging allegiance to the flag will not learn patriotism by any hypocrit-
ical actions the board may demand. The boards of education have the
power, but the advantage to be gained should be considered seriously
before any policy of coercive enforcement is adopted.
ROBERT B. GOSLINE
